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Longview v.

Taxpayers of Port of Longview, 84 Wn. 2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974).
The State of Washington, like many other states, has in recent years
undertaken to enforce detailed and stringent statutory requirements
for the control of industrial pollution within its borders.' In 1973, the
State Department of Ecology ordered two private corporations operating in Washington, Weyerhaeuser 2 and Kaiser, 3 to install certain air
pollution.control devices in their industrial plants. 4 Pursuant to state5

1.

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE chs. 70.94 & 90.48 (Supp. 1973).

2. Weyerhaeuser Co. Inc. [Weyerhaeuser] is a Washington corporation.
3. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co., Inc. [Kaiser] is a Delaware corporation.
4. Weyerhaeuser operates a paper and cardboard products plant at Longview.
Washington: Kaiser operates aluminum reduction plants at Tacoma. Washington and
at Mead in Spokane County, Washington. The Department of Ecology entered orders
for Kaiser and Weyerhaeuser to meet a schedule for the reduction of air pollutant
emissions from their respective plants by 1974 and 1975. respectively. The facilities
required in each case are complex. The estimated cost of the facilities at Kaiser's
Mead plant is S16,200.000: at Kaiser's Tacoma plant S13,800.000: and at Weyerhaeuser's Longview plant $19.900,000. Trial Transcript at 20 & 37. Port of Longview
v. Taxpayers. 84 Wn. 2d 475. 527 P.2d 263 (1974).
5. Ch. 132. § 4. [1973] Wash. Laws 375 [hereinafter referred to as ch. 132].
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.95A.030 (Supp. 1973). provides in relevant part:
In addition to any other powers which it may now have. each municipality shall
have the following powers:
(2) To lease, lease with option to purchase, sell or sell by installment sale, any
or all of the facilities upon such terms and conditions as the governing body may
deem advisable but which shall at least fully reimburse the municipality for all
debt service on any bonds issued to finance the facilities and for all costs incurred by the municipality in financing and operating the facilities and as shall
not conflict with the provisions of this chapter:
(3) To issue revenue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring
or improving any facility or facilities or for refunding any bonds issued for such
purpose and to secure the payment of such bonds as provided in this chapter.
Section 5 of ch. 132, id. § 70.95A.040, specifically provides that the bonds may not
give rise to any pecuniary liability on the part of the issuing municipal corporation:
(1) All bonds issued by a municipality under the authority of this chapter shall
be secured solely by revenues derived from the lease or sale of the facility. Bonds
and interest coupons issued under the authority of this chapter shall not constitute
nor give rise to a pecuniary liability of the municipality or a charge against its
general credit or taxing powers. Such limitation shall be plainly stated upon the
face of each of such bonds.
See also ch. 132, §§ 6(2)-(3). WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.95A.050(2). (4) (Supp.
1973).
Chapter 132 authorizes the lease of the facilities to the user corporation with rent
in an amount sufficient to pay bond premiums. taxes on the facilities, amounts
necessary to build and maintain reserves which the municipal corporation deems use-
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and federal 6 statutory schemes, Weyerhaeuser and Kaiser sought to
use tax exempt industrial revenue bonds issued by the port authorities
of Longview and Tacoma and by the County of Spokane to finance
the construction of the pollution control facilities. The respective
municipal corporations 7 agreed to issue "no recourse" 8 industrial revenue bonds to finance the projects. The transactions took the form of
purchases by the municipal corporations from Kaiser and Weyerhaeuser of leasehold interests in the projects for sums equal to the

ful and maintenance and insurance on the facilities. Ch. 132, § 7, WASH. REV. CODE §
70.95A.060 (Supp. 1973). Bonds can be refunded upon agreement between the issuing
body and the bondholders. The statute specifically states that the bond proceeds
"shall be applied only for the purpose for which the bonds were issued." Ch. 132, §
8, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.95A.070 (Supp. 1973). The only exceptions are for use of
accrued interest and unused proceeds to retire the principal debt owing. The cost of
the facilities includes not only the cost of the facilities themselves but also "all expenses in connection with the authorization, sale and issuance of the bonds to finance
such acquisition or improvements; and the interest on such bonds for a reasonable
time prior to construction, during construction, and for a time not to exceed sixmonths after completion of construction." Ch. 132, § 9, Wash. Rev. Code § 70.95A.080
(Supp. 1973). The conditions of the disposition of the facilities are left to the municipal corporation issuing the bonds. Finally, the municipal corporation or private
user of the facility is permitted to request a certificate from the Department of Ecology
stating that the facility was designed to abate, control or prevent pollution and to meet
state and local standards for pollution control and abatement. Ch. 132, § 11, WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.95A.100 (Supp. 1973). The statute also permits the issuing authority
to specify the conditions under which the bonds are issued including the private
revenues which may provide security on the bonds. In addition, the statute allows
bondholders in case of default to pursue their remedies in rem against the properties
securing the bonds. Issuing authorities may by agreement allow bondholders to proceed against the private revenues as well as force the municipal corporation through
a writ of mandamus to pursue legal action against the private corporation. Ch. 132,
§ 6, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.95A.050 (Supp. 1973).
Ch. 132, § 6(5), WASH. REV. CODE § 70.95A.050(5) (Supp. 1973), authorizes the
municipal corporation to "provide for the appointment of a private trustee or trustees
for the protection of the holders of the bonds." The trustees can also be given the
duty of distributing the proceeds of the bond issuance; collecting revenues from the
facilities and paying the same to the bondholders; and paying the proceeds from the
sale, insurance or condemnation of any facility to the bondholders. Id.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103 (c) provides in pertinent part:
Paragraph (1) [relating to the disqualification of industrial development bonds
as tax free municipals] shall not apply to any obligation which is issued as part
of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of which are to be used to provide...
(4) (F) air or water pollution control facilities ....
7. The term "municipal corporation" is used to refer to municipalities, counties
and port districts.
8. No recourse bonds are those which are not in any manner secured by the
credit or assets of the issuing public body. In case of default, the bondholders cannot
look to the municipal corporation but must look to the security of the real borrower
in interest and the revenue of the project. See Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations
on Public Industrial Financing:An Historicaland Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 265, 313-18 (1963).
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proceeds from the sale of the bonds, together with a simultaneous sublease of the facilities to Kaiser and Weyerhaeuser for periodic rental
payments. Kaiser and Weyerhaeuser each agreed to pay the municipal
corporations a yearly sum for services performed as agent in the distribution of the rental payments to the bondholders.!' The lease-sublease
agreements between the respective private and municipal corporations
were in all cases conditioned on the continued exemption of bond
interest from federal income tax' 0 and on the constitutionality of the
state statute authorizing issuance of revenue bonds. "
Taxpayers of Longview, Tacoma and Spokane alleged that these
financing schemes, together with the underlying statute, violated Article VIII, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, which
reads:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter
give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid
of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the
necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock or bonds of any association, company or
corporation.
In the consolidated action, the trial court held that the lease-sublease
arrangements were valid agreements, that the benefits flowing to the
corporations as a result of the transactions emanated solely from the
federal government, and that the bond issues in question were expressly authorized by Washington statute. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that no giving of aid or
credit by the municipal corporation was involved and that the issu9. The trial court found: "Kaiser agreed to pay ... a $2,000 per year management fee [to the County of Spokane] .... " Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law § XI at 7, Port of Longview v. Taxpayers. 84 Wn. 2d 475. 527 P.2d 263 (1974).
10. The sublease from the Port of Longview to Weyerhaeuser states that it may
be terminated by the sublessee by paying to the sublessor in cash an amount equal to
the remaining principal and accrued interest on the bonds if "[p rior to the issuance
of Bonds having an average life of five years or more, Sublessee determines, based
upon any ruling of the Internal Revenue Service, the opinion of any court or advice
of its counsel that the Lease or Sublease or any provision of either will result in
significantly adverse tax consequences to Sublessee .... ." Sublease from Port of Longview. Washington, to Weyerhaeuser Company, Art. III, § 3.2(d)(i), at 11. April 20.
1973 (copy on file at Washington Law Review): see Sublease from Port of Bellingham, Washington, to Georgia Pacific Corporation, Art. Ill. § 3.2(d)(vi) at 8-9, Mar.
23, 1973 (copy on file at Washington Law Review).
I1. Sublease from Port of Longview, supra note 10, at Art. VIII. § 8.1, p. 31;
Sublease from Port of Bellingham, supra note 10. at Art. VI. § 6. 1, pp. 14-15.
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ance of the bonds ultimately served a public purpose. Plaintiffs
appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed.
Held: The statutes authorizing the issuance of pollution control revenue bonds and the actions taken by the respective municipal corporations pursuant to those statutes violated Article VIII, Section 7 of the
state constitution by permitting and effecting, the lending of public
credit for private purposes. Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of Port of
Longview, 84 Wn. 2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974).
Port of Longview is important for at least three reasons. First, the
court has adopted a new construction of the constitutional provision
prohibiting the lending of public credit, thereby overruling sub silentio
numerous longstanding Washington decisions. Second, the decision
renders it nearly impossible for the State of Washington or any of its
subdivisions to issue no recourse revenue bonds for the benefit of private persons. Third, the decision virtually insures that the disappointed parties will offer proposals for a constitutional amendment in
the near future.
This note will initially describe the federal scheme encouraging the
issuance of tax-free municipal bonds, state constitutional prohibitions
against the lending of public monies or credit generally, and particular
Washington constitutional provisions and their treatment by the
Washington court prior to Port of Longview. Second, the note will
analyze the court's reasoning in Port of Longview with respect to revenue bond financing and the constitutional lending of credit provisions. Third, the note will identify and discuss the policy considerations at issue in the case. Fourth, the note will consider the scope of
the holding in Port of Longview and examine certain probable ramifications of the decision. Finally, there will be proposed a state constitutional amendment authorizing bond financing for the benefit of private parties to serve public purposes.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND
The Federal Tax Exemption: Section 103

The federal statutory framework exempting from federal income
tax the interest on certain state and municipal bonds is quite elementary. Internal Revenue Code [hereafter I.R.C.] Section 103(a) provides that, "gross income does not include interest on (1) the obliga-
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tions of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, or
any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of
12
Columbia." Although this section has had a turbulent history, it
nonetheless exemplifies longstanding Congressional approval of spe13
cial tax treatment for state and municipal improvement financing.
To insure that the federal tax exemption in fact benefits public enti-

ties, I.R.C. Section 103(c) generally disallows the exemption in the

case of industrial development bonds, which most often inure to the
benefit of private enterprise.1 4 However, the federal statute carves out
broad exceptions for publicly issued industrial development bonds

which facilitate certain federally approved activities. Tax-exempt status
is granted by Section 103(c) for interest received on industrial devel-

opment bonds which finance: (1) residential family housing; (2)
sports facilities; (3) convention or trade show facilities; (4) airports,
docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities, parking facilities, or storage
or training facilities connected with these; (5) electric or gas energy
plants; sewage and solid waste treatment plants; (6) air and water
pollution control facilities; (7) facilities to furnish water which are
available on reasonable demand to the public; (8) industrial parks
except for the buildings and structures actually to be used by the

12. Section 103, providing for tax free interest upon municipal and other governmental obligations, had its origin in Int. Rev Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b)(4), 53
Stat. 10. No substantive changes were made until after more than two decades of
academic and legislative criticism of abuses arising from the use of the tax free interest
feature for the benefit of financing industrial plants. Congress in the Revenue and
Expenditure Control Act of 1968, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 266, amended § 103 to eliminate
tax free interest benefits for all industrial development bonds not issued for exempt facilities. Despite continued criticism, in the Revenue Act of 1971. § 315(b). 85 Stat.
529, Congress extended the exemption for small industrial developments to facilities
valued at less than $1,000,000. The previous limitation was $250,000. H.R. REP. No.
413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1969).
13.

See J.

CHOMMIE

FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION

72 (1973);

Early. Financing

Pollution Control Facilities through Industrial Development Bonds, 27 Tax Law. 85.
91 (1973); Comment, The Limited Tax Exempt Status of Industrial Development
Bonds under Subsection 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1649
(1972). For an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of industrial development bonds
as an economic stimulant versus the tax cost of these bonds, see Surrey. Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures
with Direct Govermnental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 371-80 (1971). Surrey
points out that in 1969 the federal revenue loss generated by the tax exempt feature
on municipal bonds was $2.63 billion while the consequent interest savings to public
issuing bodies was estimated at only $1.86 billion. Id. at 372 n.27. Although it cannot
be doubted on the basis of these figures that the tax exemption is an inefficient means
to encourage certain kinds of investment, there is currently no serious move to repeal
the tax provision.
14. I.R.C. §§ 103(c)(l)-(2) (1968): Treas. Reg. 1.103-7(b)(3)-(4) (1972).
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industries; and (9) industrial development, where the total amount of
the project does not exceed $5,000,000 for any single private person
in one political subdivision. 15 Thus, interest on bonds for developments which have a public use in the nature of or related to utilities,
or which serve, through the nonproductive investment of certain individuals and corporations, a specific Congressionally approved purpose,
are generally tax exempt.
To determine whether a given bond measure is an obligation of a
public entity so as to exempt interest thereon from taxation under Section 103, the federal government does not require that the bond truly
be an obligation of the issuing governmental unit, but merely that the
governmental unit make a legislative determination of the bond purpose and actually issue the bond. 16 The Treasury Department takes
the position that the issuing municipal corporation is merely a conduit
through which the bond proceeds pass to the private corporations and
the premiums pass to the bond purchasers. 17 It merely makes the benefits available to the other parties. The private corporation is treated
as the real issuer of the bonds and borrower of the funds. It is permitted all of the interest, depreciation and other deductions available
15. I.R.C. §§ 103(c)(4)-(6).
16. The Treasury Department has deferred to the legislative intent of state governments and municipal corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(b) (1956) states: "Obligations issued by or on behalf of any State or local governmental unit by constituted authorities empowered to issue such obligations are the obligations of such a
unit."
The Service states that the following treatment will be given to the asset and the
corporation if its four-part test, see note 18 infra, indicates a lease transaction:
(1) the corporation will be considered the purchaser and original user of the
facility;
(2) the corporation is entitled to the I.R.C. § 38 investment credit on qualifying
parts of the project;
(3) the corporation must consider as income any premium of discount on the
bonds;
(4) the corporation is not entitled to any rent reductions;
(5) the corporation is entitled to deductions for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in the operation of the project, including the trustees fees;
(6) the corporation is entitled to the deductions for state and local taxes;
(7) the corporation is entitled to all interest deductions with respect to that part
of the rent attributable to the bond premiums;
(8) the corporation is entitled to the depreciation deductions. Rev. Rul. 590,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 68. See also Rev. Rul. 74-290, 1974 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 25, at
8 (same on sublease arrangement).
17. The conduit theory is implicit in Rev. Rul. 134, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 60.
Since only the party making the expense may deduct it, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has recognized that the private corporation is the real issuer of the bonds and
therefore entitled to deduct its reimbursement expenses paid (as rent) to the municipal corporation.
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to the financed party' 8 and is required to amortize the cost of issuing
the bonds over the life of the project.' 9 The bond purchasers are
granted tax free treatment on the bond interest.
B.

State ConstitutionalProhibitionsGenerally

The Washington constitutional provision found violated by the pollution control bonding statute at issue in Port of Longview is similar
to those in most states. 20 While the language varies from state to state,
it has a common origin. In the 19th century, municipal corporations
issued bonds, guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the municipality, to' finance railroad construction. If the railroad failed, as many
did, the municipal corporations were liable on the bonds. To end such
unwise use of public funds, constitutional provisions were introduced
in most states which completely banned or severely restricted the right
of the state or its subdivisions to give money or property. or to lend
money or credit, to or for the benefit of private individuals or corpo2
rations. '
A survey of the various state constitutional provisions reveals that
five general approaches have been utilized to limit a municipality's
power to lend public credit. Some state constitutions absolutely prohibit the lending of credit or money to or for the aid of any private

18. Rev. Rul. 590, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 66. The Internal Revenue Service provides for a four-part test to determine whether the transaction is a lease rather than
a financing arrangement. First, for the transaction to be treated as a financing agreement. the corporation must be obligated to repay the principal and interest in the
form of basic rent. In addition. the operation. maintenance and finance expenses may
be added on as additional rent. Second. in case of default, casualty or condemnation.
the corporation must have rights parallel to those of the mortgagor. Third. there must
be express or implied intent that title should pass to the corporation. Fourth. the
political subdivision shall have assumed no risk of loss with respect to the project.
nor have opportunity for gain. Id.
19. Rev. Rul. 134, 1973-1 Curt. BULL. 60. These expenses must be capitalized
because, although they are ordinary expenses made in the ordinary course of a trade
or business, they produce benefits which extend beyond the taxable year. Some payments made without legal obligation under such a lease-sublease arrangement may be
expensed by the corporation. Rev. Rul. 517. 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 37.
20. The Washington constitutional prohibitions against gifts and lending of public
property. monies and credit are derived from N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (1846) which
stated: "'The credit of the State shall not. in any manner, be given or loaned to any
individual, association or corporation." N.Y. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE,
PROBLEMS RELATING TO TAXATION AND FINANCE 106. 112 (1938).
21. See State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia. 80 Wn. 2d 672. 675. 497 P.2d 924. 926
(1972): Pinsky. supra note 8, at 277-84: J. WASh. SIATE CONSIITUIIONAI CONVENTION
680(1889).
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person, 22 while a number of other states have limited the lending of
credit to the service of a "public purpose. '2 3 Some states permit the
lending of public credit only for projects approved by a certain percentage of the constituency, 24 whereas some states simply have no
constitutional provision relating to the lending of public credit.2 5 Finally, many states have amended their constitutions in the face of judicial hostility to industrial development bonds and now permit legislatures to enact laws enabling the state and/or local government to issue
no recourse revenue bonds. 26 As of this writing, only one state constitution other than Washington's has been construed to forbid the issu27
ance of pollution control bonds.
1.

The majority rule

In approximately 38 states having constitutional provisions similar
to Article VIII, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, courts
have upheld industrial development or pollution control bonding legislation, generally on one of two bases. First, courts have reasoned
that the public purpose served by the encouragement of employment,
expansion of the tax base and abatement of pollution is sufficient to
22. These states have utilized two methods to forbid lending of public monies
or credit. Some have an absolute prohibition couched in language similar to that of
the New York Constitution. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. VII, § I.Other states forbid
the legislature to authorize the lending of credit or monies by the state (see, e.g., N.C.
CONST. art. 5, §4; Tax. CONST. art. 3, § 52b) or by political subdivisions (see, e.g.,
Mo. CONsT. art. 3, §§ 39(1), (2)).
23. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 1(a); People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53
Ill. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972); NJ. CONST. art. 8, §§ 2-3, Roe v. Kervick, 42
N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964); MONT. CONST. art. 8, § 5, Fickes v. Missoula Co.,
155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970).
24. For example, Mo. CONST.art. 6, § 27, provides:
[A] ny city or incorporated town or village of this state by vote of 4I7ths of the
qualified electors voting thereon, may issue ... revenue bonds for the purpose of
paying all or part of the cost of purchasing, constructing, extending or improving any of the following: . . .(2) plants to be leased ... to private persons for
manufacturing and industrial development purposes.
See also LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 14b(2)-(3); ME.CONsT. art. IX, §9 8-A & 14-A.
25. Vermont has never had a constitutional proscription against lending public
monies or credit; Connecticut has been without one since 1965. See CONN. CONST.
art. X, § 3 (1877).
26. See note 43 infra.
27. In Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Development, 284 N.C. 15, 199
S.E.2d 641 (1973), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a statute authorizing pollution control bonding was violative of the constitutional public purpose requirement. In dicta, the court suggested that the activity amounted to an unconstitutional lending of public monies and credit. 199 S.E.2d at 657.
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remove the legislation from the scope of the constitutional proscription.
These courts read into the lending of credit provision an exception for
28
public purpose even where private persons might be benefited.
Second, courts have reasoned that there can be no lending of public
credit without the incurring of public liability. These courts, however,
have restricted the meaning of "public funds" and "public credit" to
sums raised under or guaranteed by the taxing power of the public
body. 29 In four states with constitutional provisions nearly identical to
Washington's, reviewing courts have limited the lending of credit proscription to cases in which public taxing power directly or indirectly
guaranteed the bonds; 30 those courts have expressed the view that rev-

28. See, e.g., DeArmond v. Alaska State Development Corp.. 376 P.2d 717
(Alas. 1962); Wilmington Parking Authority v. Runken. 34 Del. Ch. 439. 105 A.2d
614 (Del. Sup. 1954); State v. Ocean Highway & Port Authority, 217 So. 2d 103
(Fla. 1968): Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499
P.2d 575 (1972): Norvell v. City of Danville. 355 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1962): Opinion
of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 268 N.E.2d 149 (1971): Albritton v. City of Winona,
181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938); Fickes v. Missoula Co.. 155 Mont. 258. 470 P.2d
287 (1970) (alternative holding): Roe v. Kervick. 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964):
Sublett v. City of Tulsa. 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965); Harper v. Schooler. 258 S.C.
486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972) (alternative holding): Clem v. Yankton. 83 S.D. 386.
160 N.W.2d 125 (1968) (alternative holding); Pack v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co..
215 Tenn. 503, 387 S.W.2d 789 (1965); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante. 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973) (alternative holding): People ex rel.
City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 II. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972) (alternative
holding).
29. Rogers v. City of Mobile, 277 Ala. 261. 169 So. 2d 282 (1964); Wayland v.
Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960); Industrial Dev. Authority v. Nelson.
109 Ariz. 368, 509 P.2d 705 (1973); City of Santa Clara v. VonRaesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d
239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970); Baird v. City of Adairville, 426 S.W.2d
124 (Ky. 1968) (alternative holding); Police Jury v. Taxpayers, 278 So. 2d 474
(La. 1973); Northeast Shoe Co. v. Industrial & Recreational Fin. Approval Bd.. 223
A.2d 423 (Me. 1966); Wilson v. Board of County Commissioners, Civil No. 146
(Md. Ct. App., Nov. 7, 1974); Minnesota Housing Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 155.
210 N.W.2d 298 (1973); Tintera v. Planned Indus. Expansion Authority. 459 S.W.2d
356 (Mo. 1970); Fickes v. Missoula Co.. 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970):
Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956); Gripentrog v.
City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1964); Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Development Authority, 433 Pa. 40, 248 A.2d 212 (1968): West v. Indus. Development Bd..
206 Tenn. 154, 332 S.W.2d 201 (1960): Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante. 58 Wis.
2d 32. 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973) (alternative holding); Foster v. North Carolina
Medical Care Comm'n, 283 N.C. 110, 195 S.E.2d 517 (1973); State ex rel. County
Court v. Demus. 148 W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352 (1964); Allardice v. Adams Co.,
173 Colo. 133, 476 P.2d 982 (1970); People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53
Ill. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972) (alternative holding); Reed v. City of Cheyenne.
429 P.2d 69 (Wyo. 1967); Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5
(1964): Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Ore. 329, 438 P.2d 725 (1968): Allan v.
Tooele Co., 21 Utah 2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968).
30. In Iowa, Wyoming, Utah and Nevada the constitutional provisions are parallel
to those in Washington and have been construed by the respective courts as not
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enue bonds are not debts of the issuing political subdivisions. 3 ' Such
definitions of credit are consistent with the historical and ordinary
meaning of the term.
Historically, the term "credit" in the typical constitutional lending
of credit clause referred to a surety relationship between the public
body and the railroad or other business which was primarily liable on
the incurred debt.32 Specifically rejected was the notion that the mere
donation of the name, status and "good office" of the public body to
private persons by way of bond issuance could constitute a lending of
public credit. 33 Also rejected were the propositions that the public
body could be liable on the revenue bonds if the private corporation
defaulted, or that the potential liability of the public body for negligent
issuance of the bonds was a lending of public credit within the meaning
of the constitutional proscriptions. 34 Courts adopting this majority rule
have described the role of the issuing public body not as that of lender
or obligor, but as that of trustee for the benefit of bondholders, 35 or as
conduit between the bondholders and the private borrowers. 36
2.

The minority rule

The Port of Longview court relied upon the decisions of only three
other state courts to reject the majority rule set forth above. The Nebraska, Ohio and Idaho courts have struck down industrial development bonding schemes as violative of constitutional provisions similar
to Washington's Article VIII, Section 7, finding a loan of credit be37
cause public bond issuance was beneficial to the private borrower.

applying to industrial development bonds or pollution control bonds. See notes 28 &
29 supra. In Allen v. Tooele Co., 21 Utah 2d, 383, 445 P.2d 994, 995 (1968), the
court stated: "The County could be deemed to 'lend its credit' . . . only . . . if the
County might in some eventuality be required to pay the obligation."
31. See, e.g., Reed v. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 69, 72 (Wyo. 1967) (revenue
bonds); Uhls v. State ex rel. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 74, 87 (Wyo. 1967) (pollu-

tion control bonds).
32.

Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5, 15 (1964);

Pinsky, supranote 8, at 277-78.

33. Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80, 84 (1950).
34. Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5, 15-16 (1964).
35. See Pinsky, supra note 8, at 314.
36. Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950).
37. Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1895); State ex rel.
Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964); State ex rel. Beck v. City
of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957). Recently, the North Carolina Su-
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Both the Nebraska and Idaho decisions can and should be con-

sidered aberrant: Nebraska, because that state's supreme court indicated that liability might be imposed on the public body in the event
of default despite the "no recourse" nature of the bond,3 8 and Idaho,

because it is the only state in the union which has thus far refused to
distinguish between the general fund liability of general obligation
bonds and the special liability incurred by such obligations as revenue
bonds, special assessment bonds and the like.3 9 Moreover, both Ne-

braska and Idaho have amended their constitutions to permit industrial development and pollution control bonding legislation. 40 The
Ohio court, in State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand,41 relied extensively

upon a constitutional clause, without counterpart in Washington,
which limited public debt to the aggregate of both "direct and con42
tingent" debts.
preme Court, in a case not cited in Port of Longview, invalidated a pollution control
bonding scheme holding that since the issuance of the bonds directly benefited private
industry with only "incidental or secondary" benefit to the public, such issuance violated the "public purpose" provision of the North Carolina Constitution. Stanley v.
Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641, 655-56 (1973).
That the Stanley court grounded its decision only on the "public purpose" requirement was made clear when it stated:
[T] hat these appeals involve no expenditure of tax funds, does not exempt the
cases from the [public purpose requirement]. The public purpose requirement
determines not only the projects for which the legislature may authorize the expenditure of tax money but also those which it may empower the created authorities to undertake and to finance by the issuance of tax-exempt bonds.
Id. at 655. The "public purpose" approach was expressly rejected by the Washington
court. See Port of Longview, 84 Wn. 2d at 490, 527 P.2d at 271.
38. In State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269, 272
(1957), the Nebraska court stated:
The issuance of the bonds in the name of the city for the payment of the cost of
the project evidences the fact that the credit of the city has been extended. The
city is the payer of the bonds and it is primarily liable for their payment. The
bonds become the obligations of the city ....
A failure of payment is a default
by the city ....
If evidences of indebtedness by interested private persons are inadequate and revenue bonds of the city are sufficient, either the credit of the city
has been extended or their purchasers are victims of a base delusion.
Either conclusion is in fact fallacious.
In Kirby v. Omaha Bridge Comm'n, 127 Neb. 382, 255 N.W. 776, 779 (1934). the
Nebraska Supreme Court gave effect to the no recourse language in a bond issue
holding that city construction of a bridge and issuance of revenue bonds payable from
bridge tolls involved no illegal expenditure of public funds nor did the bonds create a
general obligation of the city. The continuing vitality of Kirby is doubtful, however.
in light of the Beck court's discussion of public liability.
39. Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32. 129 P. 643 (1895).
40. Nebraska amended its constitution in 1968 specifically to permit no recourse
industrial development bonds. NEB. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-3. Idaho adopted a similar
amendment in 1974. IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3(A).
41. 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
42. 197 N.E.2d at 333. The Washington court has held that contingent liability
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3. Constitutional amendments removing the lending of credit restriction
Constitutional amendments in many states 43 now permit revenue
bond or general obligation bond financing for pollution control and industrial development. Three methods have been employed: (1) the
lending of credit proscription has simply been removed; 44 (2) a specific
constitutional exemption to the proscription has been adopted for certain no recourse revenue bonds; 45 and (3) general obligation bond
financing amendments with voting requirements and financing or debt
46
limitation provisions have been adopted.
Each of these amendment schemes has inherent weaknesses. Complete removal of all constitutional limitations upon public assistance
to private persons provides little guidance as to whether other general
does not support a finding that credit has been loaned. See note 59 infra.
43. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3(a); LA. CONST. art.
XIV, 99 14(b.l)-(b.3); ME. CONST. art. IX, §§ 8-A, 14-A; NEB. CONST. art. XIII,
§§ 1-35; N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 8(3); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 35; ORE. CONST. art.
XI, §§ 9-10; S.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; VA. CONST. § 185. Omitted from CONN.
CONST. OF 1965 was a long-standing public lending prohibition. Compare CONN.
CONST. of 1955, art. X, § 3 (1877). Indiana has enacted legislation to permit public
financing of private pollution control facilities. IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-4.5 (1974).
44. Connecticut removed its lending of credit proscription in 1965. See note 43 supra.
45. Tfiese provisions vary in scope. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c), pirovides:
[T] he issuance and sale by any county, municipality, special district or other local
governmental body of (1) revenue bonds to finance or refinance the cost of capital
projects for airports or port facilities or (2) ... for industrial or manufacturing
plants to the extent that the interest thereon is tax exempt from income taxes
under the then existing laws of the United States, when ... the revenue bonds
are payable solely from the revenue derived from the sale, operation or leasing
of the projects.
46. In Louisiana, for example, the amendment provides for the issuance of recourse industrial development bonds. It is more specific than Florida's with respect
to terms of the bonds and the amount authorized. The issuance of bonds by any
municipal corporation is subject to the consent of its electorate. LA. CONsT. art. XIV,§
14(b.2)-(b.3). Interestingly, the Louisiana court has held that no recourse industrial
development revenue bonds do not fall within the voting requirement of art. XIV, §
14(b.2) because such bonds cannot become obligations of the state. Police Jury
v. Taxpayers, 278 So. 2d 474 (La. 1973); Northeast Shoe Co. v. Industrial & Recreational Fin. Approval Bd., 223 A.2d 423, 425 (Me. 1966).
N.Y. Co sT. art. VII, § 8(3) exempts certain financing from the general prohibition against lending of public funds or credit:
Nothing in this constitution contained shall prevent the legislature from authorizing the loan of the money of the state to a public corporation to be organized
for the purposes of making loans to non-profit corporations to finance construction of new [industry], . . . provided, however that any loan . . . shall not
exceed forty percentum of the cost ....
Thus, New York permits recourse bonds issued by the state, but limits the percentage
investment on any project. See also NEB. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-3; ORE. CONST. art.
XI, § 10; VA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
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constitutional provisions apply. Moreover, where credit of the public

entity guarantees the primary corporate obligation, municipal bond
47
ratings undoubtedly are affected and bond premiums rise.
On the other hand, restrictive provisions permitting no recourse
revenue bonds only for those activities specifically exempted by Section
103 appear too narrow in scope. Such provisions do not determine the
constitutionality of such popular schemes as issuing no recourse bonds
to build hospitals, assisting college students2 8 or granting tax credits for
the construction of nonproductive facilities. 4" By restricting the state
to a limited array of federally-approved revenue bond programs. these
narrow constitutional provisions preclude state experimentation with
alternative methods to aid in the financing of private activities which
the state finds desirable.,"
Where states have permitted general obligation bond financing of
economic development or pollution control with requirements of voter
approval, legislative approval, debt limitation or scope of financing
limitation, attempts have been made to exclude industrial revenue
bonds from the scope of the provisions. Courts have generally been
convinced that since industrial revenue bonds are not secured by
public funds, the constitutional strictures pertaining to general obliga5
tion bond financing are not applicable. '
These state constitutional amendments described above obviously suggest a popular desire to limit judicial review of the constitutionality of certain revenue and/or general obligation bond financing.
Yet, the existing amendment schemes, even within their applicable
scope, fail to adequately address the multitude of legal issues attending public debt financing. A proposal for a constitutional amendment which attempts to do so is offered in Part V, below.

47. This is true because the secondary security for the bond is that ot the issuing
public entity. See letter from Thomas J. Dowd. Vice President. Seattle-Northwest Securities Corp.. to author. Jan. 6. 1975. on file with Washington Law Revies.
48. See Parts IV-B & C infra.
49. Pond. Pollution Control Bonds: Are They Contaminating the Munticipal
Market?, The Daily Bond Buyer-SIA Supp.. Oct. 25. 1974. at 3.
50. Surrey. The Financing of Neiw Social Progras-a-nd Tax Exemption. NtNICIPAi- BOND FINANCING 77. 97-105 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Hdbk. No. 12. 1969).
5 I. The experience in Louisiana is illustrative. See note 46 supra.
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C. The Washington Court's Treatment of Article VIII, Section 7,
Prior to Port of Longview.
The Washington court adopted prior to Port of Longview a four
point approach to application of the state's constitutional proscription
against the lending of public money or credit. Under this approach,
the court has: (1) suggested that whenever monies raised by the taxing
power enter the public treasury, such monies become public funds
within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 7; (2) applied the same
test to determine the presence of indebtedness within the meaning of
constitutional debt limitations as it uses to determine whether credit
has been extended; (3) held that debt limitations do not apply to revenue bonds which may be retired solely from the proceeds of the
project financed; and (4) developed, in rudimentary form, a trust
theory to interpret the duties and obligations of the public entities
with respect to the retirement of special fund bonds.
1.

The public treasury test

In Yakima v. Huza,5 2 voters sought by initiative to have a certain
municipal tax removed and prior collections returned directly to the
taxpayers or distributed to them in the form of credit against future
taxes. The Washington court held that even if the municipal ordinance authorizing the collection of the funds were repealed ab initio,
the monies already collected remained public funds. Repayment of
those funds would constitute a prohibited gift of public funds, and a
tax credit based upon those funds would constitute a prohibited
lending of municipal credit. 3 Broadly applied, Yakima v. Huza
stands for the proposition that once funds enter the public treasury
they cannot lose their public character.
2.

Testfor public indebtedness and lending of public credit

In Seattle & Lake v. Seattle Dock Co.,5 4 the court adopted a
common test for the presence of public debt and public credit, reasoning that the sine qua non for a loan of state credit was state lia52.

67 Wn. 2d 351,407 P.2d 815 (1965).

53.

Id. at 359, 407 P.2d at 820.

54.

35 Wash. 503,77 P. 845 (1904).
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bility on the debt. The court reviewed a statute which provided that
navigational waterways could be dredged by private contractors and
that the state would secure payment of the dredging costs by encumbering adjacent state tideland and shorelands. Appellants, who purchased state lands subject to contractors' liens arising out of agreements made pursuant to the statute, argued that Article VIII, Sections
355 and 556 of the Washington State Constitution were violated since
the state in effect loaned its credit for the benefit of the contractors. In
57
rejecting that argument, the court stated:

The lands were to be appraised and not sold for less than the appraised price, but the purchasers of these lands were required to take
notice of the lien created by the cost of filling the same, and were
bound to pay for the improvements. So that no aid or credit was given
by the state directly or indirectly to the [contractor]. . . . The state
While it may have been
was not even liable to discharge the lien ....
an advantage to the [contractor] ... to be able to purchase at the appraised price .... we fail to see that the credit of the state was thereby

loaned or in any manner given to the [contractor] ....

WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1889) provided:
Except the debt specified in sections one and two of this article, no debts shall
hereafter be contracted by. or on behalf of this state, unless such debt shall be
authorized by law for some single work or object to be distinctly specified therein.
which law shall provide ways and means, exclusive of loans, for the payment of
the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty years from the time of the contracting thereof.
No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received a majority of all the votes cast for and
against it at such election, and all moneys raised by authority of such law shall
be applied only to the specific object therein stated, or to the payment of the debt
thereby created, and such law shall be published in at least one newspaper in
each county. if one be published therein, throughout the state, for three months
next preceding the election at which it is submitted to the people.
Compare amends. 48 & 60, the latter being the current version of art. VIII, § 3.
56. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5. provides: "The credit of the state shall not, in any
manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation."
57. 35 Wash. at 514. 77 P. at 848. The court applied the same test to plaintiffs
complaint that the authorization of special indebtedness provision was violated and
found no indebtedness within the meaning of the provision. Id. at 515. 77 P. at 848.
It is incontrovertible that the Seattle Dock court's construction of Article VIII.
§§ 3 and 5 applies equally to Article VIII § I. limiting state indebtedness, and Article
VIII, § 7. proscribing the lending of municipal money or credit. The court in State
ex rel. Capitol Comm. v. Clausen. 134 Wash. 196, 235 P. 364 (1925). applied the
same test to determine the presence of indebtedness for the purpose of the Article 8.
§ I debt limitation and the Article 8, § 3 authorization of debt requirement.
Clausen has been followed consistently. See, e.g., Wittier v. Yelle, 65 Wn. 2d 660.

55.

454

Municipal Credit
The court employed similar reasoning in First National Bank v.
Pasco,5 8 in which it ruled that with respect to no recourse revenue
or special fund bonds, the risk of forfeiture falls upon the bondholder, not the issuing municipality. Thus, for purposes of the debt

limitation and lending of public monies or credit proscriptions, it appears that no recourse issuances cannot give rise to either public
60
indebtedness 5 9 or extension of public credit.
3.

The specialfund doctrine
The Washington court has generally applied the special fund doc-

trine to both debt limitation provisions and restrictions on the lending
of public credit. In State ex rel. Finance Commission v. Martin,6 1 the
court held the constitutional provisions relating to indebtedness inapplicable when a special fund exists, i.e., where revenues by which a
project is financed are derived exclusively from operation of the
project and where the state does not undertake to provide any part of
399 P.2d 319 (1965) (meaning of debt for purposes of both §§ 1 and 3 of Art. 8 is
an obligation for repayment); State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.
2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). Moreover, the court in Port of Longview implicitly
recognized the correlation between Article VIII, § 5 and Article VIII, § 7 by relying
on a Nebraska decision proscribing the lending of state credit. State ex rel. Beck v.
City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957). See also note 155 infra.
58. 131 Wash. 28,228 P.2d 838 (1924).
59. The Washington court has historically limited the liability of the issuing public corporation with respect to revenue bonds. It is certain that contingent liability
such as would arise from a failure of the municipality to pay the collected bond retirement funds to the bondholders does not give rise either to indebtedness or credit.
See Berglund v. City of Tacoma, 70 Wn. 2d 475, 481, 423 P.2d 922, 925 (1967).
60. The court has drawn a fine distinction between the presence of credit and the
presence of a current exchange. In O'Connell v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 79 Wn. 2d
237, 484 P.2d 393 (1971), the Public Utility District (PUD) agreed to accept the
assignments of installment contracts arising from the sale of electrical equipment to
PUD electrical customers. The court held that the additional electrical usage generated by the extra equipment was insufficient consideration to remove the transaction
from the lending of credit proscription. The court reasoned that respondent had
presently expended public money and that the payment was in exchange for the
right to receive future repayment with interest. On the other hand, in Washington
Natural Gas v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn. 2d 94, 459 P.2d 633 (1971), the
court held that rebates from public funds given by the PUD to builders for constructing all electric homes involved no lending of credit since the extra electrical
usage generated by the homes was adequate consideration for the rebate. Query
whether there is any real differehce between the cases? In O'Connell the PUD at
least had a chance for repayment of the amount extended to the vendors while in
Washington Natural Gas, the PUD recouped the rebate from the future projected
electrical usage.
61. 62 Wn. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963), noted in 39 WASH. L. REv. 145 (1964).
See also Note, 31 WASH. L. REv. 101 (1956).
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the fund or to guarantee the fund from revenues generated under its
general taxing power. 62 Since the Martin court relied on Comfort v.
Tacoma 63 and Winston v. Spokane,64 cases construing the lending of
credit provisions, as supportive of the special fund doctrine, it appears
that the doctrine applies equally to both debt limitation and lending of
credit provisions. Thus, Washington precedent suggests that if the
issuance of a bond by a public entity is retireable from the income generated by the project and if no public liability is thereby created, the
special fund doctrine removes the bond from the scope of the lending
of public monies or credit proscriptions.
4.

The trust fund theory

The Washington court has utilized trust principles to analyze the
duties of a public entity engaged in activities such as Local Improvement District (LID) financing. Thus, in Keyes v. City of Tacoma,6 5
the court stated that where LID assessments on real property are the
sole basis for the retirement of the LID bonds, the funds collected
are trust funds; the city is the trustee and the bondholder, the cestui
que trust.
The trust fund theory applied in Keyes may be harmonized with the
public treasury theory enunciated in Yakima v. Huza,66 simply by
recognizing the factual distinction between the cases. In Keyes, the
special assessment funds at issue were payable solely to the bondholders; thus the court's conclusion was quite proper that the city,
despite its possession of the funds, was but the trustee on behalf of the
bondholders as beneficial owners. Contrariwise, in Huza, the funds
generated by the general taxing measure under dispute were obviously
public from the moment of collection. Thus, under either theory, the
nature of the funds is determined not solely from the fact of posses67
sion, but also from the type of activity generating the revenue.
62. Id. at 661, 384 P.2d at 842.
63.
142 Wash. 249, 252 P. 929 (1927).
64. 12Wash. 524,41 P. 888(1895).
65.
12 Wn. 2d 54, 120 P.2d 533 (1941). For a general discussion of the trust fund
doctrine in the private corporate setting, see Ellis & Sayre, Trust-Fund Doctrine Revisited, 24 WASH. L. REV. 44 (Part I), 134 (Part II) (1949).
66. 67 Wn. 2d 351, 407 P.2d 815 (1965).
67. "But the true test of its [the special fund doctrine's] application here is not
what comes out of the funds but what goes into it." State ex rel. Finance Comm'n v.
Martin, 62 Wn. 2d at 661, 384 P.2d at 842.
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D.

Amendment 45

Although the Port of Longview court did apply parts of the four
point approach developed to interpret the state's constitutional proscription against the lending of public money or credit, the court did
not even consider whether amendment 45 of the Washington State
Constitution should apply to the bonds issued by the Ports of Tacoma
and Longview. Amendment 45 provides:
The use of public funds by port districts in such manner as may be
prescribed by the legislature for industrial development or trade promotion and promotional hosting shall be deemed a public use for a
public purpose, and shall not be deemed a gift within the provisions
of section 7 of this Article.
Since the court insisted that the bond proceeds were public funds
within the scope of the constitutional lending of monies and credit
provisions, it is important to appraise the court's failure to regard
Amendment 45 as an exemption from the general lending of public
monies and credit proscriptions.
The court may have reached the conclusion that Amendment 45
was inapplicable for either of two reasons. First, it may have reasoned
that although Amendment 45 removes the proscription against gifts of
public funds to private persons with respect to certain port district
expenditures, it does not specifically remove the proscription against
lending of public monies or credit. Such a technical construction of a
constitutional provision, however, contravenes every principle of constitutional construction set forth by the Washington court.68 A reasonable and logical interpretation of Amendment 45 suggests that if cer-

68. State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn. 2d 138, 143, 146 P.2d 543, 546
(1944) ("Constitutional provisions should be interpreted so as to give effect to the
manifest purpose for which they were adopted.") See also Gruen v. Tax Comm'n,
35 Wn. 2d 1,211 P.2d 651 (1949).
In State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia, 80 Wn. 2d 672, 676, 497 P.2d 924,
926 (1972), the court stated:
In the interpreting of our constitution the language employed must be taken and
understood in its natural, ordinary, general and popular sense .... In the ordinary and popular sense, a loan of money or credit is at once understood to mean
a transaction creating the customary relation of borrower and lender.
See also State ex rel. O'Connell v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 79 Wn. 2d 237, 484 P.2d
393 (1971); State ex rel. State Capitol Comm'n v. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 P. 858
(1916).
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tain gifts are permitted, a fortiori lending of public credit should be
permitted in the same context.1 :'
Second, the court may have reasoned that pollution control facilities do not per se serve "industrial development" purposes since they
are nonproductive facilities required by law. Such an analysis is inconsistent with the broad construction given the term "industrial development" by the I.R.C. and Treasury Department,70 by other states
dealing with similar constitutional challenges, 7 ' by the constitutional
history of Amendment 45 and by the the court's rule of construction
that language in constitutional provisions is to be given its natural,
ordinary and popular meaning. 72 Since today pollution control equipment is an integral part of every industrial plant producing pollutant
"by-products," financing of such equipment would seem to fit within
the general meaning of industrial development. Thus, if one assumes,
as did the Port of Longview court, that the financing by the Ports of
Tacoma and Longview constituted lending of public credit, it seems
69, It is submitted that the court purposely avoided gift reasoning. First. were it
to apply gift analysis, the transaction would fit squarely within Amendment 45 which
pertains to gifts. Second. only gifts of property or monies, rather than of the name.
status or "good office" of the municipality, are prohibited by Article 8. § 7. of the
state constitution. All of the cases which have thus far been decided under this constitutional prohibition apply it to money or tangible property. See, e.g.. State ex rel.
O'Connell v. Port of Seattle. 65 Wn. 2d 801. 399 P.2d 623 (1965); State ex rel.
Wash. Navigation Co. v. Pierce County. 184 Wash. 414. 51 P.2d 407 (1935). In
addition, the language in Johns v. Wadsworth. 80 Wash. 352. 354. 141 P. 892 (1914)
(relied upon by the Port of Longview court). describes the gift provision in such a
manner that property must be something with a calculable value. Finally. decisions
from other states, see, e.g., Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184. 131 N.W.2d
5 (1964). have limited the term "gift" to its common sense meaning. The Port qf
Longview court may have employed the lending of credit concept to avoid these
difficulties.
70. See I.R.C. §§ 103(c)(2). (4). The Treasury Department has found transit
equipment. Rev. Rul. 181. 1961-2 CUt. BULL. 24. marketing facilities. Rev. Rul. 150.
1955-1 CUM. BULl. 14. and water works. Rev. Rul. 41. 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 13. to be
industrial development.
71. In State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman. 89 Nev. 330. 512 P.2d 1321 (1973).
the Nevada Supreme Court included air pollution control equipment within the meaning of the County Economic Development Revenue Bond Law designed to encourage
industry to locate in Nevada. See NEv. CONST. art. 8. §§ 9-10: NEv. REV. SisT. §§
244.9191-.9219 (1967). The Oregon Supreme Court. in Carruthers v. Port of Astoria.
249 Ore. 329, 438 P.2d 725 (1968). construed ORE. REV. STAI. § 777.560 (1955)
which states that ports can "provide ... funds ... for industrial uses and purposes....
and issue and sell revenue bonds .... " without the bonds becoming a general obligation of the port. to contemplate the entire financing of an aluminum reduction plant.
including pollution control equipment required by law. See also Police Jury v. Taxpayers. 278 So. 2d 474. 476 (La. 1973): Fickes v. Missoula Co.. 155 Mont. 258.
470 P.2d 287. 289 & 294 (1970).
72. See note 68 supra.
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inescapable that Amendment 45 exempts the ports from the constitutional lending of public monies and credit proscription."3 The court,
however, managed to avoid the inescapable.
II. THE REASONING OF THE PORT OF LONGVIEW COURT
Although the court properly analyzed the lease-sublease agreements
in Port of Longview as financing arrangements, it mistakenly employed this reasoning to justify the conclusion that public credit had
been extended. The court reached its result by reasoning that the bond
proceeds became public funds upon passing through the public treasury, and that public credit was extended despite the absence of public
liability because the actions of the public bodies bestowed benefits
upon the private corporations, and arguably deterimentally affected
future public financing opportunities by some incalculable measure.
The court also offered some rather questionable analysis of bond
market economics while in the same breath, it disavowed any reliance
upon such analysis.
A.

Analysis of the Financing Transactions

The court's analysis of the agreements to finance the pollution control facilities as in fact security agreements, even though couched in
terms of lease-sublease, was quite proper. The lease-sublease disguise
was apparently constructed to avoid any "real or imagined.., state
constitutional problems." 7 4 The financing arrangements served three
basic purposes of the private corporations: (1) to provide them with
full use and ownership of the financed pollution control facilities; (2)
to provide them with the advantageous bond premium rates; and (3)
to give them the federal and state tax deductions and credits available
to them as the facility owners.7 5 Since, as is characteristic under a
financing arrangement, the corporations contemplated ownership of
73. Of course, if one properly assumes that the funds generated by no recourse
bond issuance such as that in Port of Longview are not "public" at all, then neither
Amendment 45 nor any of the provisions of Article 8 are applicable. See Part II
infra.
74. 84 Wn.2d at 482, 527 P.2d at 267.
75. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law § VI, Port of Longview. As owners
and lessors, the private corporations also qualify for a credit against the state sales,
use and business and occupation taxes. See WASH. REv. CODE § 82.34.050 (1967).
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the facility rather than a leasehold, the court was undoubtedly correct
in analyzing the transaction as a financing arrangement regardless of
76
the language in the arrangement.
A simple determination, however, that the underlying arrangement
was a financing arrangement sub nom. lease-sublease leaves the analysis incomplete. The presence of a financing arrangement presupposes
a debtor-creditor relationship. The creditor provides the funds, risks
financial injury in case of default and possesses cognizable rights as a
bankruptcy creditor. The debtor utilizes the funds provided by the
creditor and is also liable on the obligations. In Port of Longview, the
"real" creditors were the bondholders since the municipal corporation's right of enforcement was limited to its rights under the leasesublease agreement. Since only the private corporations were liable on
the bonds in the event of default, and only the private corporations
could be made the subjects of bankruptcy actions, they must be considered the "real" debtors. 77 The municipal corporation, at the behest
of the real parties in interest, merely made the transaction possible by
physically issuing the bonds with the resulting tax-free interest attributes and transfering the proceeds and premiums to the respective parties.
The above analysis comports with the "conduit theory" applied by
the Treasury Department to bonding schemes similar to those examined in Port of Longview.7 8 Unfortunately, the Port of Longview
court relied upon Treasury Department analysis only to find that what
were in form lease-sublease arrangements were in substance security
agreements. The court failed to proceed through the analysis to iden76. 1 G. GILMORE. SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.6 (1965).
cited in Port of Longview, 84 Wn. 2d at 482, 527 P.2d at 267.
77. Annual Review and Investment Lists, 1975 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 1796-97.
This note reasons that the instrument is treated as an unsecured debenture of the private corporation since such treatment would be accorded the instrument under the
Bankruptcy Act. Interview with Thomas J. Dowd, Vice President, Seattle-Northwest
Securities Corp.. in Seattle, Jan. 6, 1975. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18.
Port of Longview, copy on file with Washington Law Review. (The transcript of oral
argument is an unofficial document, prepared from a tape recording of oral argument
before the supreme court. The original tape recording is on file with the supreme court
clerk. The clerk does not provide official transcripts from the tape recordings.) A
financing arrangement exists if the private corporation has the actual burden of repayment, pays the actual operating and financing expenses, has the rights of a mortgagor
in event of default, casualty or condemnation, obtains legal title permanently at some
point and assumes with the bondholders all risk of loss and opportunity for gain on
the project. See note 18 supra.
78. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
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tify properly the relationship of parties. The court's conclusion that
the municipal corporations were the "real" debtors in the subject
transactions seems clearly infirm.
B.

Special or GeneralFund?

The court evidently disagreed with the Treasury Department's position that the public issuing body is a mere conduit through which the
bond proceeds and tax benefits pass to the real borrowers, the private
corporations.7 9 The court instead adopted the fiction that any funds
passing through the public treasury become ipso instanto public funds
in the state constitutional sense 0 and reasoned that the municipal
corporations were the actual borrowers of the bond proceeds; they in
turn loaned the proceeds, now public funds, to the private corporations to finance pollution control equipment. 81
This analysis represents a broad extension of the definition of
public funds and directly contradicts both the trust fund analysis of
Keyes v. City of Tacoma,8 2 and the special fund analysis of State ex
rel. Finance Comm'n v. Martin.83 Just as the monies collected on LID
assessments in Keyes were trust funds rather than public funds, where,
as in Port of Longview, the municipal corporation is bound under the
terms of the bond, the ordinance and the underlying financing instruments to turn over all bond proceeds to the private corporations, such
proceeds should be considered trust funds while in the possession of
the municipal corporation. Similarly, if the special fund doctrine described in Martin is applicable "where all moneys in the fund are de79. Rev. Rul. 134, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 60.
80. During oral argument one justice stated: "[A] t some point in time it changes
its status and becomes something else ... isn't there a point in time at which this is
municipal money before it gets into the hands of the corporation or goes into a special fund?" Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 77, at 23.
81. The court stated:

The money which is raised by the municipal bond issues and which ultimately is
used by the private corporations to acquire, construct, and install their pollution

control facilities is the municipality's money. Counsel for respondents conceded
this in oral argument. The bonds were issued by the municipal corporation, and
the proceeds from their sale came into the municipal treasury.
84 Wn. 2d at 481, 527 P.2d at 266. The conclusion that respondent's counsel con-

ceded at oral argument that the funds were public appears incorrect. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 6, 8,9. Only under an overly technical reading of Article VIII, § 7, could the funds be considered public.
82. 12Wn. 2d 54, 120 P.2d 533 (1941). See PartI-C-4 supra.
83. 62 Wn. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). See Part I-C-3 supra.
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rived from revenues produced from the object created by the bonds," 8 4
it seems beyond dispute that the same reasoning applies where, as in
Port of Longview, repayment funds for revenue bonds are derived
exclusively from private revenues, without recourse to any other funds.
The court's apparent rejection in Port of Longview of the trust fund
analysis and the special fund doctrine as applied to the proceeds of the
pollution control revenue bond casts substantial doubt upon the continued vitality of these doctrines in Washington. It appears that the
court's public treasury analysis is not limited to situations in which the
actual borrower is a private entity, but rather extends to instances in
which the actual borrower is a public entity, i.e., all special purpose
revenue bond schemes formerly immune from the constitutional
public debt limitations8 5 or voter approval requirements. 86 The foreseeable consequences of this not unreasonable interpretation should
prompt the court to clarify, if not reconsider, its public treasury analysis so as to insure the vitality of the trust fund analysis and the special fund doctrine.
C.

The Benefit-Detriment Theory of Public Credit

The Port of Longview court expanded the definition of "extension
of public credit" to include any transaction in which one party receives an obvious benefit made available by a public entity which may
suffer some detriment. By physically issuing the pollution control
bonds in their respective public names, the municipal corporations in
Port of Longview made available to the private corporations certain
favorable credit terms unobtainable through any other source. The
court apparently considered it inconsequential that the actual source
of the benefit was the federal Department of the Treasury. 87 The court

84. 62 Wn. 2d at 659, 384 P.2d at 841, citing Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524.
41 P. 888 (1895).
85. E.g., local improvement district bonds.
86. E.g., special school levy bonds.
87. 84 Wn. 2d at 488-89, 527 P.2d at 270-71.
88. 84 Wn. 2d at 485. 489, 527 P.2d at 268, 270. The court's description of the
possibility of some detrimental economic impact is little more than that: "To the extent that these transactions affect the state's ability to carry out its other functions, it
is a loan of the state's credit in a very real sense." Id. at 486, 527 P.2d at 269. Does
this mean that if, for the sake of argument, a S20,000,000 bond issue caused a public
body to lose $100,000 in future interest, the bond issue was a loan of the state's
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also considered the bond issuance potentially detrimental to the
issuing municipalities 8 8 since in the event of default, the credit rating
of the municipal corporations might somehow be impaired, thus increasing the premium rate paid by those municipalities for future issuances.8 9
The adoption of the benefit-detriment theory is both attractive and
dangerous. The theory provides the court a useful tool with which to
implement its own policy decisions regarding public assistance to private persons; on the other hand the theory contradicts both the special
fund doctrine and the trust fund theory: If the court decides that a
public body has in fact assisted a private person, under the benefitdetriment theory, it need not even determine whether public liability
has in fact been incurred or public funds in the traditional sense have
in fact been loaned or expended. If this is a correct statement of the
effect of Port of Longview, it overrules the court's recent decision in
State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia,9 0 in which the court upheld
the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the time deposit of mu-

nicipal funds in banks, mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations. The court held that Article VIII, Section 7, does not
prohibit ordinary deposits or time deposits because "[t] he protection

credit "to the extent" of $100,000? Or does it mean, as the.opinion in its entirety
suggests, that if in any particular respect the municipality's future financing ability is
possibly impaired, regardless of the net economic effect, the bonding scheme is totally
invalid? Could not the private corporation under the former interpretation simply pay
the municipality $100,000 and thereby remove the detriment? Under either interpretation, the court's statement begs the question, since it depends upon facts which are, to
the knowledge of this author, nonexistent.
Moreover, the court refused to consider the potential economic benefit to the public
bodies, thereby failing to analyze the net effect of the public issuance upon the public
fise. See State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957)
(where the Nebraska court recognized the economic benefit). Beck, relied on by the
Port of Longview court, also rested solely on the assertion that "[t] he loan of its
name by a city to bring about a benefit to a private project, even though general
liability does not exist, is nothing short of a loan of its credit." 82 N.W.2d at 272.
The Beck court did note that some administrative burdens would be cast upon the
public body issuing the bonds, id. at 271-72, but the Port of Longview court
could not cogently offer this reasoning, since the public bodies in that case received
compensation for their services. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
If should be noted that the court's finding of a security agreement precluded a gift,
rather than loan, analysis. See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 supra.
89. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 23; see text accompanying
note 101 infra.
90. 80 Wn. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972). Such an interpretation of Port of Longview would also lead to the conclusion that Seattle Dock has been overruled. See
notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
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against loss of public deposits . . . is .
. complete and absolute."9 1
Thus, although the court found that the private banking institutions
were in fact benefited by the deposits, the court went on to find that
in fact there was no detriment to the public fisc and that there was no
loan.
Since the Port of Longview court did not identify the quantum of
benefit necessary to invoke the benefit-detriment test, the decision has
an in terroram effect upon all special fund revenue bonding which
tends to benefit private persons other than "the poor and infirm." 92 It
appears that the new test restricts the special fund doctrine and the
trust fund theory to situations in which both public means and public
ends are involved and where the benefit to private persons is both incidental and de minimis.
D.

Bond Market Economics

The court analyzed three facets of the economics of pollution control bond financing. First, it adopted a highly theoretical view of the
natural impact of pollution control or industrial development bond
issuance upon municipal general obligation bond premium rates. Second, it found potential detriment to municipal financing by describing
a hypothetical and unrealistic impact of revenue bond default upon
the local municipal general obligation bond market. Third, it disregarded evidence indicating that economic expansion would result
from completion of pollution control facilities.
1.

Washington and the national bond market

The court fallaciously reasoned that an analysis which may have
some merit with respect to the national bond market has immediate
application to the Washington municipal bond market. It theorized
that if there were an increase in the issuance of pollution control
bonds, the spread between interest rates on municipal and private
corporate bonds would shrink since "higher tax-exempt municipal
bond premiums must be offered in order to find a sufficiently large
municipal bond purchasing market adequate to finance such state and

91.
92.
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local needs . . . .93 Thus, higher premiums must be offered to attract
taxpayers in lower tax brackets.9 4 With respect to the national market,
95
this position has found support among some experts in the tax field.

The court's thesis is subject to attack on three points. First, even
with respect to the national market, the data collected thus far is admittedly inconclusive because of the bond analyst's inability to determine the influence of such factors as inflation, the policy of the federal
tax system and structural changes in the bond market itself upon industrial development and pollution control bond purchases. 96 In fact,
statistics indicate that since 1968 municipal corporations have enjoyed a greater spread between municipal general obligation bonds

and corporate bonds after pollution control bond issuance than be97

fore.
Second, the bond market is not unified. Just as there is a gradation
of risk among municipal bonds--from pollution control bonds as the
least secure, to industrial development bonds and special fund revenue
bonds, and finally to general obligation bonds as the most secure-with
93. 84 Wn. 2d at 488, 527 P.2d at 270.
94. Contrary to the trial court's belief, pollution control bonds are designed to sell
at a 25% incremental tax bracket rather than at a 50% bracket. This is to provide a
broader market for this particular type of bond. At this rate, the spread, i.e., the difference between the exempt bond and a: taxable bond of the same rating, is about 2%.
Trial Transcript at 69-70, Port of Longview. Neither the New York Times nor the
Wall Street Journal articles cited by the court are on point. The Times article deals
with the high cost of municipal credit occasioned by the "tight" money policy of the
Federal Reserve Bank. Climbing Interest Rates, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 47,
col. 6. The other deals with the impact of industrial development bonds and pollution
control bonds on the national bond market upon which Washington bond sales have
little impact. Leger, More Companies Sell Tax-Exempt Bonds For Pollution Control,
Saving Millions, Wall Street Journal, July 8, 1974, at 24, col. 1.
95. See, e.g., Renshaw, Industrial Pollution Control Tax-Exempt-Is There a Better Way? The Daily Bond Buyer--SIA Supplement, Oct. 3, 1973, at 3; Surrey, supra
note 50, at 87-96.
96. Surrey, supra note 50, at 85.
97. Pond, supra note 49, at 21. Pond offers the following table from his study
of 523 issues between 1971 and 1974. The percentages reflect the difference (spread)
between the interest rates of an average exempt bond and an average taxable bond with
identical rating. (The rating represents the measure of the "credit-worthiness" of the
security on the bonds.)
Taxable/Exempt Rates as a % of Taxable Ratios
Grade
Date
Baa
A
Aa
Aaa
4/71
70%
71%
70%
68%
67%
68%
68%
4/73
67%
64%
64%
64%
63%
4/74
Id. This table includes both general obligation bonds and industrial development and
pollution control bonds as exempt bonds. However, the analysis remains the same.
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each type of bond paying a respectively lower interest rate, so there is a
specific market for each type of bond. Trust departments must buy
general obligation bonds to fulfill fiduciary investment obligations;
insurance companies and banks may take greater risks and invest in
revenue bonds. 98 Mutual funds, banks investing long-term deposits
and high income taxpayers take the greatest risk and invest in industrial development bonds and pollution control bonds. 9 9
Third, there is general agreement among bond market analysts that
the market for municipal general obligation bonds is unaffected by the
issuance of industrial development bonds or pollution control bonds
in Washington.'"° Washington's share of the bond market is relatively
insignificant. In addition, since the market for the bonds is national,
the premium rate on Washington bonds is affected by the issuance of
general obligation, industrial development and pollution control bonds
in other states. Finally, on the local level, industrial development,
urbanization, level of unemployment and other local factors determine
the opportunities for and limitations of municipal financing. Thus,
there is reason to discount the application of the national analysis
to the local bond market.
2.

Impact of default on municipal bond credit rating

The Port of Longview court apparently did not believe that public
credit would be unaffected by the issuance of pollution control bonds.
The statements of one Justice during oral argument are revealing:10 1
[Justice:] Let us admit that the default might be remote but if there is
a default might that not financially injure the port district's ability to
issue other bonds.
[Counsel for the Respondents:] The finding of the trial court and the
testimony of the experts, your honor. ...
[Justice:] That is a

. .

. conclusion of law. I have some doubts as to

whether it is valid or not.
In Washington, default on no recourse pollution control bonds or
98. Trial Transcript at 55, Port of Longview.
99. Id. at 50-51, 55, 71-72 (testimony of Mr. Roger Mehle, expert witness on
municipal bonds).
100. Id. at 66-68; see Letter from Thomas J. Dowd, Vice President SeattleNorthwest Securities Corp., to author. Jan. 6. 1974, on file with Washington Law
Review.
101. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 19.
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industrial development bonds has no impact on general obligation
bond rates. Since in Washington no recourse statements in statutes,
ordinances and bond issues will be given effect against the bondholder,10 2
pollution control bonds such as those in Port of Longview are
effectively secured only by the credit of the private corporations actually
using the facilities and paying the bond premiums. 10 3 Default on the
10 4
bonds affects only the bond rating of the private corporations.
3.

The court's disregardof beneficial economic impact

Not only did the Port of Longview court misapply analysis of the
national bond market, but it also refused to consider the beneficial

economic effects of the legislation which it declared unconstitutional.
The court apparently was unconvinced that the construction of the
facilities would have any positive impact upon the availability of employment. 10 5 Yet, municipal bond issuances clearly aid the job market

by making possible the financing of pollution control facilities for
older and marginal plants which may otherwise be forced to shut down
106
because they fail to comply with state pollution control requirements.
Moreover, improved facilities clearly have a positive effect upon

local real property tax revenues, for the availability of municipal bond
102. See First National Bank v. Pasco, 131 Wash. 28, 228 P. 838 (1924) (statutory
limitation of liability to special assessment fund given effect).
103. Trial Transcript at 50-51, 66-67, Port of Longview (testimony of Mr. Roger
Mehle, expert witness on municipal bonds). For example, if the town of Cle Elum,
Washington, issued general obligation bonds to finance a swimming pool for its high
school, the bonds would have the lowest class rating or would be unratable because
the city has a low credit rating. On the other hand, if the town issued industrial development bonds for Weyerhaeuser on the same day, these bonds would have a
class A rating of a middle grade industrial because Weyerhaeuser enjoys such a rating
on its debt financing. See id. at 71 (testimony of Mr. Mehle) & 92 (testimony of
Mr. C. F. Anderson, expert witness on municipal bonds).
104. See id. at 65-66 (Carter hypothetical to Mehle). Despite the language in State
ex rel. Beck v. York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269, 272 (1957), relied on by the
Washington court, that "either the credit of the city has been extended or [the bond]
purchasers are victims of a base delusion," pollution control bonds in fact are sold in
large denominations to trust department, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds
and high income taxpayers who are fully cognizant of the inherent risks and benefits
of purchase. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supranote 9, at § XH1.
105. In oral argument, the supreme court balanced the reduction in employment
generated by the Weyerhaeuser facility against the increase in employment at the two
Kaiser facilities, concluding that the statistical results were inconclusive. Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 15, 16.
106. On November 5, 1974, Simpson Timber Company announced that it intended to close its insulating board plant in Shelton, Washington, for economic and
environmental reasons. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 5, 1974, at C6, col. 3.
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financing offers competitive financing rates which tend to attract new
industry.10 7 Finally, authorization of such federally tax exempt financing in Washington removes the competitive disadvantage suffered
by Washington taxpayers whose federal tax dollars would otherwise
effectively support the federal tax exemption for pollution control facilities in almost all other states but their own.' 0 8 It is reasonable to
predict that the foregoing beneficial effects would in turn cumulatively
"stimulate the economy and provide many additional jobs,"10 9 thus
producing the "economic ripple effect" recently found so praiseworthy
by the Washington court in Anderson v. O'Brien."10 Such benefits
have been regarded as sufficient to constitute a public purpose,"' and
to remove the transaction from the constitutional proscription against
2
lending of public monies and credit.'
By ignoring economic factors of substantial bearing, ostensibly
relying upon largely unrealistic economic factors and abusing the lawfact dichotomy beyond reason, the Port of Longview court adopted an
unduly cavalier approach to the case at bar. The insult is not abated,
113
but rather aggravated, by the court's parting statement:
Our function is not to weigh the economic impact of the transactions.
The loan of money or credit by a municipality to a private corporation
is a violation of our state constitution regardless of whether or not it
serves a laudable public purpose.
The court leaves one feeling that visceral reaction has been given free
reign and reasoned judgment forsaken.
III.

POLICY DETERMINATIONS

It is unfortunate that the court in Port of Longview did not set forth
the policy determinations upon which its decision was grounded. An
examination of the cases cited with favor by the court provides only
an indication of the nature of these determinations. Generally, the
107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wisc. 2d 32.
205 N.W.2d 784, 796-99 (1973).
108. See note 121 infra.
109. Anderson v. O'Brien. 84 Wn. 2d 64, 70. 524 P.2d 390, 394 (1974).
110.
Ill.

Id.
Id.

112. Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1. 77 Wn. 2d 94.
103-04, 459 P.2d 633, 639 (1969).
113.
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court was concerned with the impropriety of assisting "big business"
and high income taxpayers at the expense of smaller businesses and
low-to-middle income taxpayers. In addition, the decision evinces a
judicial distrust of local governmental action. Finally, the court was
certainly aware that environmental concerns would not be furthered
by a "pro-bonding" decision. The reasoning and result in Port of
Longview raise the fundamental question whether the court should
effectuate such policy determinations traditionally left to legislative
bodies.
A.

Aid of Big Business

Although the court's opinion does not explicate its predisposition
against large corporate enterprise, such a bias surfaced a number of
times during oral argument. Persistently, the court pressed the respondents as to whether industrial development of pollution control
bonding schemes were actually available to small as well as large businesses." 4 The court undoubtedly found its suspicions substantiated by
1 5
the rather bald assertions of the courts upon which it relied.
The Port of Longview court also expressed suspicion at oral argument that Washington taxpayers would be "gouged" for the sake of
the private corporations." 6 Although not cited in Port of Longview,
the North Carolina court in Stanley v. Department of Conservation
and Development" 7 also suggested that tax free bonding would injure
state taxpayers. The Stanley court reasoned that the applicant businesses could in any event afford the cost of pollution control facilities,
distinguishing situations, such as the issuance of revenue bonds to

114. It was indicated at oral argument that the financial arrangements utilized by
Kaiser and Weyerhaeuser would also be available to smaller corporations and other
businesses. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 10-12.
115. In State ex rel. Beck v. York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1957),

the Nebraska Supreme Court expressed this fear:
To permit such encroachments upon the prohibitions of the [state] constitution
would bring about, as experience and history here demonstrated, the ultimate

destruction of the private enterprise system.
The Idaho court in Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353
P.2d 767, 775 (1960), implied that a decision in favor of the bonds would constitute
the favoring of some industries at the expense of others and would act to encourage
"socialism." See also Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Development, 284
N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641, 657 (1973).
116. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 13.
117. 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
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finance low income housing, which could not otherwise attract private
investment. Pollution control was viewed as merely another cost of
doing business. Adopting the Surrey analysis" t 8 as applied to the bond
market, the court reasoned that the cost to the taxpayers in the form
of higher bond premiums could not be justified by the relative advantage which would be enjoyed by a few favored corporatons. I 19
The Port of Longview court also objected to favoritism of high income taxpayers. The court cited with approval language from a
House Ways and Means Committee report complaining that the benefits of tax free municipal bond interest rates were unnecessarily high to
attract the high income taxpayer and that this resulted in a federal
revenue loss of $1.8 billion annually.' 2 0 Although the national
problem obviously continues regardless of whether Washington municipalities issue pollution control bonds, the restriction of municipal
bond issuance in Washington to general obligation bonds and revenue
bonds for public purposes only would undoubtedly in some small
measure contract the availability of the bonds, shrink the premiums
and decrease the surplus benefit to high income taxpayers. It is somewhat strange, however, to find a lone state court vainly attempting to
combat the advantageous financial position of the wealthy out-of-state
bond-purchasers. ' *'
B.

Distrust of Local Government

The Port of Longview decision may also be partially explained by
the court's apparent distrust of local government. All three governmental bodies issuing the bonds did so without consulting their constituents; the decisions were made by persons such as port officials

118. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
119. 199 S.E.2d at 656-57.
120. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.. 1st Sess. 172-73 (1969). quoted, 84 Wn. 2d
at 487, 527 P.2d at 270.
121. Forty-eight other states are now permitted to issue (and 32 states are issuing)
pollution control bonds. Thus. the economic benefits of this financing gravitates to
these states; since the industrial market is national, industry is unlikely to come into
Washington where it must pay higher costs to do business. Cf. People ex ret. City of
Salem v. McMackin, 53 11. 2d 347. 291 N.E.2d 807. 813 (1972). At the same
time, Washington will effectively continue to pay an extra share of the federal taxes
used to subsidize the special interest exemption utilized by these other states. Cf.
Surrey, supra note 50. at 94-95. Clearly, the Washington court cannot control this
situation; control, if any. must be left to Congress.
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who, the court had reason to fear, were predisposed in favor of big
business. The Washington court recently has shown a strong inclination in other contexts to review critically the decisions of local officials
and to invalidate those decisions upon the slightest showing of misdealing. 122 It may well be that this inclination was at work in Port of
Longview.
C.

The Economy vs. the Environment

The court's decision also may reflect a predilection for environmental protection, at the expense of economic development. The
Washington court has treated the right to a healthy environment as
fundamental 23 and has liberally construed recent Washington legislation designed to protect the environment.' 2 4 Conjunctively, the court
has strongly favored citizen participation in governmental actions affecting the environment. 12 5 Although at first blush Port of Longview
appears antienvironmental, in fact it is consistent with the court's penchant for environmental protection: The court was undoubtedly aware
that Washington's statutory pollution control requirements would be enforced whether or not favorable financing was available to private
parties, and thus the financing schemes at issue served only economic
purposes. 2 6 In addition, the court was no doubt well aware of the
impact that Port of Longview would have on future financing of oil

122. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 84 Wn. 2d 579, 527 P.2d 1377 (1974); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974); Fleming
v. Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).

123.

Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn.

2d 271,279-80, 525 P.2d 774, 781 (1974).

124.

See, e.g., Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n,

84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke
Associates, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973). See generally Roe & Lean, The
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 and Its 1973 Amendments, 49 WASH. L. REV.

509 (1974).
125. See Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84
Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974). It is conceivable that the Port of Longview court
imposed considerations of environmental protection and citizen participation sub
silentio on the municipal corporations which approved the bonds; the bond approval
involved no public input and no environmental impact statement. Thus, although an
environmental impact statement was completed for the facilities, it is arguable that a
statement for the bond financing should have been prepared prior to the issuance of
the bonds. See Note, 49 WASH. L. REv. 939 (1974).
126.

See notes 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
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port facilities and atomic generating plants.' 27 How easy it must have
appeared to discourage both projects without mention.
IV.

RAMIFICATIONS OF PORT OF LONGVIEW

By its broad interpretation of the "loan its money, or credit" clause
of Article VIII, Section 7, the Port of Longview court sweeps within
the ambit of that constitutional provision nearly all financial transactions, other than ordinary payroll and contract payments, involving
the issuance of a public obligation. Hence, those attempting to
restrict the reach of Article VIII, Section 7, will in the future
undoubtedly argue that the extension of credit at issue benefits
"public," rather than "private," enterprise. Thus, the court will be
called upon to construe the "to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation" language of Article VIII, Section 7, to
determine the constitutionality of particular extensions of credit. Yet
this allows the court to apply what could become in essence a public
purpose test: the court will be at liberty to decide both what the
"benefits" are, and whether the beneficiary is or is not "public." For
example, the court will decide whether a financing arrangement which
is intended primarily to benefit the public, but which secondarily aids
certain private enterprise, is an unconstitutional extension of credit. 2' 8
The nearly unlimited scope of judicial review is readily discernible;
Port of Longview may prohibit the lending of public credit in any
case in which the public has provided directly or indirectly some benefit to a private person.
The assertion of judicial power by the Washington court, despite all
good intent, seems particularly improper in Port of Longview. The
general presumption of constitutionality of legislation' 29 is even
stronger in the economic context; l3 0 in reviewing legislation dealing

127.

See Leger, More Companies Sell Tax-Exempt Bonds For Pollution Control,

Saving Millions, Wall Street Journal, July 8. 1974, at 24. col. 1. cited, Port of Longview, 84 Wn. 2d at 488 n.3, 527 P.2d at 270 n.3.
128. In State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia, 80 Wn. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924
(1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 90-91 supra, the court found constitutional the purchase of time deposits by a municipality, suggesting that: "The primary
purpose was not to aid the banking institutions, but to benefit the city .... Id. at 677.
497 P.2d at 927.
129. Pinsky, supra note 8, at 318.
130. Hemphill v. Washington State Tax Comm'n, 65 Wn. 2d 889. 891, 400 P.2d
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with economic issues, the Washington court has traditionally deferred
to legislative fact-finding, 13 1 "unless, aided only by facts of which a
court can take judicial notice, it can be said that the legislative declaration on its face is obviously false."' 13 2 Moreover, courts will not construct hypothetical situations 133 suggesting unconstitutionality, absent
"compelling countervailing considerations in the public interest."'1 34
And where the legislature has made a declaration of public policy, 135
the Washington court has repeatedly expressed its disinclination to
disregard it.136
When these principles are applied in the public financing arena, the
impropriety of the wide-ranging, policy-oriented judicial review exhibited by the Port of Longview court becomes apparent. In Van
Diest v. Yakima County,' 37 the court, reviewing the constitutionality
of certain emergency fund expenditures, refused to consider whether
those expenditures would cause the public body to "become seriously
297, 298 (1965) (taxation). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(federal aid program).
131. In State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 584, 603, 512 P.2d 1049, 1061
(1973), the court stated: "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
will sustain [the legislation], there is a presumption that such facts exist." Similarly,
in Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn. 2d 425, 431, 353 P.2d 941, 945 (1960), the court suggested: "Where possible, it will be presumed that the legislature has affirmatively
determined any special facts requisite to the validity of the enactment, even though
no legislative finding of fact appears in the statute."
132. Hoppe v. State, 78 Wn. 2d 164, 169, 469 P.2d 909, 913 (1970) (citation
omitted). In State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wn. 2d 772, 779, 380 P.2d 735,
739-40 (1963), the court stated:
Judicial notice, of which courts may take cognizance, is composed of facts capable
of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accuracy and verifiable certainty. The court may " . . . resort to
encyclopedias, authoritative works upon the subject, reports of committees, scientific bodies and any source of information that is generally considered accurate
and reliable...."
In light of this standard, the Port of Longview court's reliance on newspaper articles,
particularly in a case of such financial complexity, is highly questionable. See 84 Wn. 2d
at 488 n.3, 527 P.2d at 270 n.3.
133. The Port of Longview court found only that "this form of financing cannot
be said to have no impact on the state's ability to finance its other governmental obligations." 84 Wn. 2d at 486, 527 P.2d at 269. This is equivalent to a finding of only
potential impact which, it is submitted, suggests that the court must have hypothesized
situations resulting in detriment to the public fisc.
134. In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962, 965 n.1, 497 P.2d 259, 261 n.1 (1972).
Note that the Port of Longview court expressly disavowed any reliance on a public
policy test. 84 Wn. 2d at 490, 527 P.2d at 271.
135. See WASH. Rav. CODE § 70.95A.010 (Supp. 1973).
136. See Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn. 2d 281, 285, 280 P.2d 1038, 1041 (1955),
and cases cited therein. See also State v. Owen, 8 Wash. App. 395, 397, 506 P.2d 900,
901 (1973).
137. 189 Wash. 411, 65 P.2d 1080 (1937).

473

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 440, 1975

handicapped in carrying on its ordinary governmental functions." 138
The court opined: "Such a condition is obviously possible, but that
presents a problem which is, in the first instance, administrative, and
in the second, legislative. Clearly, it is not a judicial problem."' 39.
Clearly, the Port of Longview court would disagree.
Although the Port of Longview court purported "not to weigh the
economic impact of the transactions," 140 this statement is belied by
the court's earlier economic discussion accompanying its finding of
potential detriment to the public fisc. 141 Of course only by engaging in

economic analysis can the court accurately determine the financial
consequences of a particular public aid or loan scheme. Nonetheless,
it is submitted that the court should adhere to the wisdom expressed in
Van Diest, by refusing to gainsay legislative determinations absent
conclusive findings to the contrary. Accordingly, in Port of Longview,
only a finding of actual, rather than potential, endangerment of public
funds would have been sufficient to support a finding of unconstitutionality. 142 The court's hypothetical findings, based upon sources of
questionable reliability,1 43 fail to adequately support reversal on constitutional grounds.
In a more immediate context, the Port of Longview decision raises
broad questions touching many areas of governmental action. For
example, the state tax credit to industry for installing pollution control
equipment 144 invites a lending of money or credit analysis; the Aid to
Higher Education Act 145 has already succumbed to reasoning similar

138. Id. at 415, 65 P.2d at 1082.
139. Id. Compare Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wn. 2d 410. 423, 502
P.2d 1170, 1177 (1972), in which the court stated: "But even assuming that the
statute might have some material [economic] impact, this factor is for consideration
during the legislative process, and has no relevance to the constitutionality of the
enactment."
140. 84 Wn. 2d at 490, 527 P.2d at 271.
141. Id. at 486, 527 P.2d at 269.
142. State ex rel. Graham v. City of Olympia, 80 Wn. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924
(1972) is instructive. In that case, the court refused to find actual threat to public
funds by purchase of time deposits with public funds because of the "complete and
absolute" insurance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 681. 497
P.2d at 929. The court distinguished Aberdeen v. Nat'l Surety Co., 151 Wash. 55. 275
P. 62 (1929), because the time deposits held unconstitutional in that case were not
"'protected . . . at all times." 80 Wn. 2d at 683. 497 P.2d at 930. In each case. the
court properly supported its conclusion with precise, factual determinations.
143. See note 132 supra.
144. WASH. REV.CODE § 82.34.050 (Supp. 1973).
145. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B. 17.010-,210 (Supp. 1973).
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to that in Port of Longview; 146 and the Washington Health Care Facilities Act 14 7 apparently falls within the scope of the decision.
A.

State Tax Creditfor Pollution Control Facilities

The Washington State Legislature recently enacted a law permitting certain businesses to apply 2 percent of the installation cost of
pollution control facilities against annual sales, use and business and
occupation tax liability to a maximum of 50 percent of the installation
cost. 148 Since such businesses are already legally bound to install the
pollution control equipment, 149 the tax credit appears to be a gift of
public money or property within the meaning of Article VIII, Section
7, of the state constitution.
Alternatively, the court might view the transaction as a lending of
credit rather than a gift. Under the benefit-detriment analysis adopted
by the court,' 50 the corporations have received an unearned benefit
from the state in the form of the tax credit; the state has suffered an
obvious detriment, a loss of revenue. Thus, credit has been unconstitutionally extended. Although the Port of Longview court did not rule
on the constitutionality of the state tax credit statute' 5 ' because the
issue was not properly raised, it is clear that the statute is vulnerable
to constitutional attack.
B.

Aid to Higher EducationAct

In State Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Graham,15 2 decided after Portof Longview, the court found the State Higher Education Assistance Act 153 violative of Article VIII, Section 5, of the state
146.

State Higher Educ. Assistance Authority v. Graham, 84 Wn. 2d 813, 529

P.2d 1051 (1974).
147. Ch. 147, [1974] Wash. Laws 3d Ex. Sess. 503.
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.34.050 (Supp. 1973).

149.
150.

See WASH. REv. CODE §H 70.94.011-.911 & 90.48.010-.907 (Supp. 1973).
Under Yakima v. Huza, 67 Wn. 2d 351, 407 P.2d 815 (1965), the fact that

a credit rather than money is provided changes the reasoning only slightly. See text

accompanying note 52 supra.
151. Similar statutes were declared unconstitutional in Stanley v. Department of
Conservation and Development, 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973). See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra; Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 83
Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960).
152. 84 Wn. 2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974).
153. WASH. REv. CODE §H 28B.17.010-.210 (Supp. 1973).
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constitution. The Act established a public corporation to provide loan
assistance to college students, which included the purchase of federally
insured student bank loans with the understanding that the lending
banks would then issue additional student loans. The program was
funded by private donations, earnings from student loans purchased
and a small amount of public operating funds. The court held that all
funds collected by the Loan Authority, a state instrumentality, were
public and that the purchase of student loans with public funds constituted an unconstitutional lending of credit despite the federal guarantee of the loans.
Although Port of Longview was not mentioned, the Graham court's
reasoning with respect to the creation of public funds appears to be an
extension of the Port of Longview analysis.1 54 In addition, the
Graham court implicitly construed the "poor and infirm" language of
Article VIII, Section 7, of the state constitution to refer only to individuals in actual need of assistance. 5 5 This reasoning indicates that
the court does not intend to limit Port of Longview only to those cases
in which public benefits are bestowed primarily upon the wealthy and
big business.
C.

Washington Health Care FacilitiesAuthority

In 1974, the Washington legislature adopted a Health Care Facilities Act15 6 providing for the financing of private hospitals. The Act
empowers a Health Care Facilities Authority to issue no recourse revenue bonds and special fund refund bonds for the construction and
leasing of hospital facilities with or without an option to purchase.
The bond proceeds are specifically labeled trust funds.' 5 7 The intent
of the Act is to provide assistance to group health and other plans in
order to curb the rising costs of hospital care.
154. 84 Wn. 2d at 818, 529 P.2d at 1054.
155. Although the Graham court recognized that the act in question was "designed by its terms to aid any disadvantaged and needy student." 84 Wn. 2d at 815. 529
P.2d at 1052, it nevertheless found:
This transaction is even more clearly a loan of credit than was the transaction
we held violative of the constitution in State ex rel. O'Connell ....
Although
that case involved Const. art. 8, § 7, the principles involved are identical.
Id. at 818. P.2d at 1054. Apparently, then, the "disadvantaged and needy" character
of the beneficiaries did not bring them within the "poor and infirm" exception ot
Article VIII. § 7, which is implicit in id. § 5.
156. Ch. 147, [1974] Wash. Laws 3d Ex. Sess. 503.
157. /d. §§ 7 &8
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The vitality of the Health Care Facilities Act is jeopardized, however, by the Port of Longview decision. Despite the trust fund language of the Act, both Port of Longiview and Graham may dictate
that these health care funds are public by virtue of their passage
through a public treasury. 158 If public funds are loaned to private persons, 159 even if for a public purpose, 160 a prohibited lending of public
monies or credit may be found. Moreover, because the issuance of
health care bonds has the same deterimental impact on future public
financing as that condemned by the Port of Longview court, the court
would likely find the Health Care Facilities Act unconstitutional on
16 1
the same reasoning as applied in Port of Longview and Graham.
D.

Conclusion

In Anderson v. O'Brien,'62 six members of the court upheld disbursements of state funds to a federally recognized Indian tribe for the
purpose of developing and constructing an industrial site and building
to be leased to private manufacturing firms in order to stimulate job
opportunities and reduce unemployment among the tribe. The court
held that the tribe was "an entity with wholly public functions" and,
therefore, a proper recipient of state funds under the State Economic
Assistance Act of 1972163 and Article VIII, Section 5, of the state constitution. The court proceeded to a public purpose analysis of the
65
transaction under Article VII, Section 1 (amendment 14),164 stating:1
Stimulation of investment and job opportunity for relief of unemployment and poverty are proper public purposes within this constitutional
provision. Where it is debatable as to whether or not an expenditure is
for a public purpose, we will defer to the judgment of the legislature.
158. See note 154 and accompanying text supra;Part I-C-1 supra.
159. The group health plans, their member physicians and beneficiaries,- are
clearly private persons who receive a benefit under the Act as a result of state action
in the form of lower hospital costs. Letter from Mr. John Riley, Counsel for King
County Group Health, Inc., to Malachy R. Murphy, Dec. 5, 1974, on file with the
Washington Law Review.
160. 84 Wn. 2d at 490, 527 P.2d at 27 1.
161. 84 Wn. 2d at 818, 529 P.2d at 1054.
162. 84 Wn. 2d 64, 524 P.2I 390 (1974).
163. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 43.31A (Supp. 1973).
164. The provision reads in part:
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits of the authority laying the tax and shall be levied and collected for public
purposes only.
165. 84 Wn. 2d at 70, 524 P.2d at 294-95.
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Thus the public purpose test was satisfied.
Some of the transactions noted above which fall within the sweep of
Port of Longview arguably may be defended on the basis of Anderson.
Anderson indicates the permissibility of extending public credit or aid
to otherwise "private" enterprises, with "wholly public functions." The
Indian tribe in Anderson was neither a truly private nor public enterprise. The court recognized that the tribe was a sovereign entity under
federal law. If the court had considered only the status of the tribe as
an entity, the extension of aid or credit to the tribe would likely have
been unconstitutional since the tribe was not a clearly public entity
such as the federal or state government, or subdivisions thereof.166
Rather, the court concentrated on the "public functions" of the tribe.
Accordingly, Anderson may be read to permit the extension of
credit or aid to entities such as a Loan Authority, as in Graham (absent the aid to sectarian schools). 167 In addition, it may be reasoned
that a group health plan serves a "wholly public function" of overseeing the health care of the population. Nonetheless, Anderson will
not provide relief from Port of Longview for enterprises such as Weyerhaeuser or Kaiser. Given the improbability of a rehearing in Port of
Longview 68 (to say nothing of a reversal upon rehearing), the only
practicable solution to the problems presented by that decision is to
amend the Washington Constitution to permit certain kinds of public
financing in aid of private persons.
V.

A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the constitutional
amendments adopted in other states to permit public assistance for
financing industrial development provides guidance in drafting a constitutional amendment in Washington.1 69 Such consideration suggests

166. Id. at 67. 524 P.2d at 393 (citations omitted).
167. It is submitted that Anderson was not applied in Grahan due to the court's
refusal to permit even indirect public aid to sectarian institutions, despite the public
nature of their activities. The Graham court failed to consider the real benefit to students and to the public generally under the loan program.
168. A study compiled by the Washington Supreme Court Clerk's office reveals
that during the last two years 87 petitions for rehearing were filed but only one was
granted. Telephone interview with William M. Lowry, Clerk of the Court, Olympia.
Wash., Jan. 3, 1975.
169. See Part I-B supra.
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the need for a balance: The amendment should be written so as to
permit bond issuance for any legislatively approved projects for which
no public liability arises, i.e., no recourse revenue bonds; and, more
stringent controls should be imposed for transactions in which the
state or a municipality is obligated on the bond, i.e., general obligation or recourse bonds. In the latter instance, voter authorization of
the lending of aid or credit should be required. The amendment proposed below attempts to accommodate both needs. In addition, it
permits limited tax credits and subsidies for legislatively approved private projects which provide broad benefits to the general population
and result in losses to the persons who must implement the projects.
The proposed amendment reads:
Notwithstanding the limitations and prohibitions applicable to gifts
of state or municipal money or property, or to loans of state or municipal money or credit, the legislature may:
(1) Authorize the state or any subdivision thereof or any municipal
corporation to issue revenue bonds to finance or refinance the cost of
any project or program deemed by the legislature to be for a public
purpose, and such issuance shall not be subject to the limitations upon
state or municipal indebtedness or to the requirement of approval by
the constituents of the state or municipal corporation: Provided, That
such revenue bonds may be secured solely by the income derived from
the project or the private person(s) whose project is financed by the
proceeds of such bonds: Providedfurther, That such bonds may never
become an obligation of the state, its subdivisions, or any municipal
corporation within the state in the event of default upon the bonds;
(2) Authorize the state or any subdivision thereof or any municipal
corporation to issue bonds secured by the full faith and credit of the
issuing body: Provided, That the purposes for which such bonds are
issued are public purposes: Providedfurther,That the limitations upon
state and municipal corporate indebtedness and the requirement that
state and municipal indebtedness be approved by a vote of the constituents of the issuing body shall apply; and
(3) Provide economic relief in the form of grants, loans or credits
to any private person within the state who has been required by state
legislative action to expend funds to further public purposes as determined by the legislature: Provided, That such relief shall not be a
special privilege or immunity.
Adoption of the proposed amendment would align Washington
with the majority of other states which have recently interpreted or
amended their constitutions to permit public assistance for financing
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certain industrial development. Authorization in Washington of financing which takes advantage of available federal tax benefits would
remove the economic disadvantages suffered by Washington taxpayers, municipalities and private industrial concerns attempting to
comply with the stringent federal and state statutory requirements for
control of industrial pollution within the state's borders. Under the
proposed amendment, pollution control facilities could be financed by
public offerings subject to the same restraints imposed upon any development affecting environmental quality: citizen input and requisite
environmental analysis, not stifling and inadequate judicial reasoning.
In addition, the proposed amendment places Washington in a position
to attract and retain desirable industries, to assist in providing financial aid to its student population, and to assist in providing health care
facilities for its general population.
The Washington court has produced in Port of Longview an
opinion which misinterprets and misapplies the law, denies the general
presumption of constitutionality afforded economic legislation and
provides only minimal guidance to prospective litigants. Although the
court's presumed objectives of preserving environmental quality and
restricting the power of the "municipal-industrial complex" may be
praiseworthy, it is submitted that such wide-ranging, policy-oriented
considerations are inherently matters for legislative and popular determination. The proposed amendment recognizes the need for such legislative and popular control in the contexts of state and municipal
financing.
Leslie A. Powers

ADDENDUM: After the final editing of this note, the Washington
Supreme Court denied petition for rehearing in Port of Longview.
The court, however, also modified its prior opinion to hold, inter alia,
that the statute at issue in Port of Longview was unconstitutional,
not on its face but as applied, notwithstanding Amendment 45. 85
Wn. 2d
,
P.2d
(1975). Portions of the
note, especially Parts I-D, II & IV supra, should be reviewed in light
of the court's modification.
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